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Abstract 16 
Farm size is a significant determinant of both groundwater irrigated farm acreage and 17 
groundwater irrigation application rates per unit land area.  This paper analyzes the 18 
patterns of groundwater exploitation when resource users in the area overlying a common 19 
aquifer are heterogeneous.  In the presence of user heterogeneity, the common resource 20 
problem consists of inefficient dynamic and spatial allocation of groundwater because it 21 
impacts income distribution not only across periods but also across farmers.  Under 22 
competitive allocation, smaller farmers pump groundwater faster if farmers have a 23 
constant marginal periodic utility of income.  However, it is possible that larger farmers 24 
pump faster if the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion is sufficiently 25 
decreasing in income.  A greater farm-size inequality may either moderate or amplify 26 
income inequality among farmers.  Its effect on welfare depends on the curvature 27 
properties of the agricultural output function and the farmer utility of income.  Also, it is 28 
shown that a flat-rate quota policy that limits the quantity of groundwater extraction per 29 
unit land area may have unintended consequences for the income distribution among 30 
farmers. 31 
 32 
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 36 
1. Introduction 37 
Theoretical models of groundwater extraction typically assume that the resource is non-38 
exclusive or that the resource users are identical.  This, along with the assumption of 39 
instantaneous interseasonal transmissivity, simplifies the analysis because there exists a 40 
representative user.  However, this approach does not take into account the spatial 41 
distribution of users, and the dependence of individual groundwater stocks on the history 42 
of past extractions (Brozovic et al 2003, Koundouri 2004). Recently, some authors have 43 
taken into account the spatial variability in groundwater use, either by relaxing the 44 
assumption of instantaneous lateral flows (e.g., Brozovic et al. 2010) or by introducing 45 
spatial heterogeneity in the marginal value of resource use (e.g., Gaudet et al. 2001, 46 
Xabadia et al. 2004).   47 
This article addresses another source of heterogeneity, that of variation in the size 48 
of the land area from which each user can access the resource.  This is an important issue 49 
because irrigated agriculture, one of the major consumers of groundwater, is comprised 50 
of farms of widely varying sizes (Schaible 2004; Hoppe et al. 2010). Knapp and Vaux 51 
(1982), Feinerman (1988), Foster and Rosenzweig (2008), and Sekhri (2011) are among 52 
the few studies addressing variation in farm size or in pumping volume.  53 
 It is well known that, to the extent that groundwater is a common property 54 
resource, private decisions lead to inefficient allocation. This result holds unless the 55 
aquifer is relatively large in comparison to total groundwater use, users can cooperate, or 56 
hydraulic conductivities are so small that the resource is effectively private (Feinerman 57 
and Knapp 1983). However, it is not clear whether heterogeneity in farm size alleviates 58 
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or exacerbates the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). To the extent such 59 
effects are present, there are potentially important policy implications, because 60 
redistributive policies will then interact with policies to correct the common property 61 
externalities: policies targeting one of these domains may have unintended impacts in the 62 
other.   63 
To understand the presence and nature of any such interactions, the following 64 
questions are posed in this article:  What are the determinants of the relationship between 65 
farm size and groundwater use intensity?  How does the distribution of farm sizes in the 66 
area influence the efficiency of groundwater allocation?  What are the distributional 67 
impacts of farmland ownership structure and water management policies? To analyze 68 
these questions a two-period model is developed where land above an aquifer, all of 69 
which can be irrigated but is of undifferentiated quality, is gathered into farms of unequal 70 
size. The differences in pumping rates across farms of different sizes in this framework 71 
are entirely due to an endogenous interaction between common property effects and farm 72 
size inequalities. 73 
For both methodological and policy reasons, it is helpful to distinguish between 74 
the cases where farmers' utility-of-income functions are linear and where they are 75 
concave.  In the first case, marginal utility of income is constant, which is an appropriate 76 
representation of cases where small farmers supplement their incomes with off-farm 77 
sources (e.g., off farm employment of some household members). Even if the underlying 78 
utility functions are concave, in these cases there is no inherent reason that small farmers 79 
have smaller incomes than (or a marginal utility of income that differs from) large 80 
farmers. The second case presumes that income from irrigated farming activities are the 81 
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sole source of income, which is more appropriate for many developing country contexts. 82 
As small farms have a smaller capacity to generate income, they have a higher marginal 83 
utility of income that raises the stakes of the tradeoffs in allocating water across farmers 84 
and across periods. 85 
Linear utility is a helpful starting point because in that case farm size inequality, 86 
in itself, does not affect average utility (equivalently, it has no direct effect on total 87 
utility, which is taken here to be the measure of social welfare). However, as shown 88 
below, the common property nature of the resource creates differing incentives to pump 89 
water across size classes, so that an increase in inequality may either amplify or moderate 90 
the common property externalities and social welfare may either rise or fall.  91 
In the linear utility case, the basic intuition is that large farms have greater spatial 92 
extent of resource access or “ownership,” so that they perceive the resource as being 93 
more private.  By the same token, a small farmer effectively owns a smaller share of the 94 
aquifer, and perceives groundwater as a more common resource. Therefore, smaller 95 
farmers tend to pump faster.  In the aggregate, more water is always withdrawn in the 96 
first period compared to the efficient solution (the tragedy of the commons still applies), 97 
but the magnitude of overpumping depends on the inequality in land holdings. In an 98 
alternative distribution of farm sizes with greater inequality, aggregate pumping in the 99 
first period may change in either direction depending on the nature of the change in the 100 
distribution. Aggregate withdrawals increase if land area is shifted towards small farmers, 101 
but the converse holds if acreage is shifted towards large farmers. The direction of the 102 
change is shown to depend on specific curvature properties of the production function 103 
relating agricultural output to irrigation.   104 
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A separate but related question is how greater inequality in farm sizes affects 105 
social welfare. The model reveals that there are dynamic as well as spatial components 106 
determining this effect. The dynamic component refers to the effect of farm-size 107 
inequality on aggregate withdrawals in the first period, or the speed with which the 108 
aquifer is depleted.  The spatial component refers to the effect of farm-size inequality on 109 
the distribution of pumping rates and income across farmers in each period.  The 110 
direction of the overall effect depends on the magnitude and direction of both these 111 
components, which are determined by additional curvature conditions on the production 112 
function. 113 
Sufficient conditions are derived that identify the cases where an increase in 114 
inequality leads to a reduction in social welfare.  These conditions are quite restrictive, 115 
requiring specific curvature properties of the production function, suggesting that there 116 
are many cases where inequality is not welfare reducing.  Indeed, in many cases  117 
inequality may actually raise social welfare because it dampens the tragedy of the 118 
commons problem. Moreover, as illustrated with a numerical example, greater farm-size 119 
inequality may imply less income inequality.  This is because of an effect similar to that 120 
identified by Foster and Rozensweig (2008): smaller farmers have a strategic advantage 121 
as they are able to poach more groundwater per unit land than their larger neighbors.   122 
When utility is concave, the analysis has another layer of complexity.   The pure 123 
income redistribution effect of the land ownership structure, keeping the allocation of 124 
groundwater fixed, must be disentangled from its effects on the equilibrium average 125 
pumping rate and the spatial distribution of groundwater withdrawals across farmers.  126 
Here, it is possible that small farmers actually pump less in the first period than large 127 
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famers. This will occur if the utility functions are “sufficiently” concave, so that small 128 
farmers (who have lower incomes) face a greater differential between marginal utilities of 129 
present and future income, and therefore, have a greater incentive to save groundwater 130 
for future use. With this as an additional determinant of pumping rates, the results 131 
discussed above continue to apply, however. 132 
  This paper may contribute to the continuing debate on the magnitude of the 133 
welfare difference between optimal control rules and competitive outcomes (Gisser 1983, 134 
Gisser and Sanchez 1980, Koundouri 2004).  Provencher and Burt (1993) identify three 135 
sources of inefficiency associated with groundwater use in agriculture: stock, pumping 136 
cost, and risk externalities.  In the presence of user heterogeneity, an access inequality 137 
externality is added to this list.  The access inequality externality arises when the rates of 138 
groundwater extraction differ across farms of varying size overlying a common aquifer.  139 
This externality can be both positive and negative, depending on whether smaller farms 140 
appropriate, on a per unit land area basis, a greater share of the common resource.  Small 141 
and large farmers can be thought of as, respectively, low and high income groups.  And 142 
so, a common resource such as groundwater may become a natural vehicle for income 143 
transfer, and can either neutralize or amplify income inequality caused by the inequality 144 
in farmland holdings. 145 
This paper also analyzes the effects of a specific but commonly implemented 146 
water management policy, namely pumping quotas, on the distribution of income across 147 
farm size classes. Using an example of a flat-rate quota policy, policy-induced gains and 148 
losses are shown to be unequally distributed across farmers. In general, the results 149 
suggest that the interactions between policies addressing farmland ownership structures 150 
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and groundwater management should not be ignored.  An effort to reduce inequities may 151 
worsen the common property problem, while efforts to reduce the common property 152 
problem may cause greater inequities.  Of course, the directions of these impacts may be 153 
the opposite so that the policies are mutually reinforcing. However, careful empirical 154 
analysis that differentiates farmers’ production relationships across size classes (e.g., 155 
Sekhri 2011) is required to determine the nature of the interactions  156 
 157 
1.1 Literature Review 158 
Knapp and Vaux (1982) and Feinerman (1988) are among the few studies that consider 159 
equity and distributional effects of groundwater management schemes.  Knapp and Vaux 160 
(1982) consider groups of farmers differentiated by their derived demand for water, and 161 
present an empirical example that demonstrates that some users may suffer substantial 162 
losses from quota allocation policies even though the group as a whole benefits.  163 
Feinerman (1988) extends their analysis and considers a variety of management tools 164 
including pump taxes, quotas, subsidies, and markets for water rights.  Using simulations 165 
calibrated to Kern County, California (USA), Feinerman concludes that while the welfare 166 
distributional effects on user groups may be substantial, the negotiations between the 167 
policy-makers and the users are likely to be difficult because the attractiveness of policies 168 
varies across users and is sensitive to the parameters.  However, following Gisser and 169 
Sanchez (1980), these studies ignore the stock externality, and assume that under 170 
competition users behave myopically and base their decisions solely on the consideration 171 
of their immediate (periodic) profits.  Also, there is no investigation of the effect of the 172 
extent of user heterogeneity on the properties of competitive allocation. 173 
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There is a rather thin literature base in development economics that is concerned 174 
with the effect of inequality in land holdings on groundwater exploitation.  Motivated by 175 
the role of groundwater in sustaining the Green revolution and developing agrarian 176 
economies, Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) consider the patterns of groundwater 177 
extraction in rural India.  They develop a dynamic model of groundwater extraction that 178 
captures the relationships between growth in agricultural productivity, the distribution of 179 
land ownership, water table depth, and tubewell failure.  Using data on household 180 
irrigation assets including tubewell depth as a proxy for irrigation intensity, they find that 181 
large landowners are more likely to construct tubewells, but their tubewells tend to be 182 
less deep than those dug by smaller landowners. Foster and Rosenzweig conclude that 183 
this is indicative of a free-riding effect in the sense that large farmers are less able to 184 
effectively poach the water from neighboring farmers by lowering the water-table under 185 
their own lands.  They also find evidence of land consolidation as a way to improve 186 
efficiency of groundwater exploitation.   187 
This paper captures some of the same effects through a simple model where wells 188 
of equal depth are already in place and each farmer faces an irrigation application rate 189 
decision.  A two-period framework with a “quasi-bathtub” aquifer is particularly well 190 
suited to fully work out the equilibrium effects of farm-size inequality on the welfare 191 
difference between the competitive and efficient allocations.  By assuming an initial 192 
stock that is scarce enough to impose tradeoffs between the two periods, both the 193 
pumping cost externality and stock externality naturally arise in the model, which are 194 
then either amplified or moderated by the farm size inequalities. The pumping cost and 195 
stock externalities are the costs that one user imposes on others through higher future 196 
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pumping costs and reduced groundwater availability, respectively.  Following Gisser and 197 
Sanchez (1980), groundwater economic studies in multiperiod settings typically consider 198 
only the pumping cost externality; Provencher and Burt (1993, 1994) are notable 199 
exceptions. 200 
Given the seasonality of production in irrigated agriculture, a groundwater 201 
resource can be regarded as a “quasi-bathtub” with  features of a common property 202 
resource over time.  The quasi-bathtub property means that the resource at each extraction 203 
point is private within each period, but the aquifer becomes a “bathtub” or purely 204 
common pool across periods.  This happens when the time period during which 205 
groundwater is extracted is relatively short, and does not allow for seepage from one 206 
point in the aquifer (such as a well or a pool) to another.  However, the water level tends 207 
to be more uniform throughout the aquifer in the long run. The quasi-bathtub assumpition 208 
is appropriate if (a) the irrigation season is considerably shorter than the time that elapses 209 
between the two seasons, and (b) wells are spaced so that the localized cones of 210 
depression caused by pumping from neighboring wells do not overlap within each 211 
irrigation season.   212 
The analysis also assume no time discounting, although farmers’ time preferences 213 
of income are captured in the concave utility model.  These assumptions ensure that the 214 
results are not an artifact of any other source of spatial or temporal heterogeneity other 215 
than that introduced by size inequality. However, the main insights and policy 216 
implications obtained in this framework carry on to more realistic settings. 217 
From here, the paper presents a simple two-period model of groundwater 218 
extraction in the presence of farm-size heterogeneity.  The social planner’s solution is 219 
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considered.  Then the paper analyzes the equilibrium allocation and the effect of farm-220 
size inequality on the pumping rates and farm income when farmers’ marginal periodic 221 
utility of income is constant.  Consideration is given to equilibrium allocation when 222 
farmers’ marginal periodic utility of income is decreasing.  Lastly, before the 223 
conclusions, consideration is given to a flat-rate quota policy that illustrates political 224 
economy issues that arise in the presence of user heterogeneity. 225 
2. Model 226 
For simplicity, the model focuses on the stock, cost, and access inequality externalities.  227 
It considers the decisions of water application per acre taking the distribution of irrigated 228 
acres across farmers as exogenous.  With slight modifications, the model can be extended 229 
to include decisions about the share of farm acreage allocated to irrigated crops.  Farmers 230 
are identical except for the distribution of land ownership, and irrigation technology is 231 
constant returns to scale.  All profits are derived from agricultural outputs using 232 
groundwater for irrigation on a fixed land area, and farmers hold exclusive pumping 233 
rights on their land.  The individual groundwater stocks are private during each irrigation 234 
season because there is no intra-seasonal well interference.  However, the groundwater is 235 
an inter-seasonal common property resource based on the groundwater hydrology over a 236 
longer time interval.  The following assumptions are standard (e.g., Negri 1989): 237 
1. (Fixed land ownership) The distribution of farmland ownership does not change 238 
over time. 239 
2. (Constant returns to scale and homogenous land quality) The agricultural 240 
production function has the property of constant returns to scale (output is 241 
proportional to farm size).  Land quality is identical across all farms.  Inputs other 242 
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than groundwater, including the choice of irrigation technology, fertilizer, crops, 243 
etc., are optimized conditional on the rate of water extraction.  Output and input 244 
prices, including energy costs, are exogenous. 245 
3. (Pumping cost) The total cost of groundwater extraction per acre increases with 246 
the pumping rate and decreases with the level of the water table (or the stock of 247 
groundwater). 248 
4. (User location is irrelevant) The aquifer is confined, non-rechargeable, 249 
homogenous, and isotropic.  The groundwater basin has parallel sides with a flat 250 
bottom.          251 
5. (Quasi-bathtub) There are no intra-seasonal lateral flows of groundwater across 252 
farms.  However, inter-seasonal changes in groundwater level are transmitted 253 
instantaneously to all users (i.e., the groundwater has an infinite rate of 254 
transmissivity during the time elapsed from one irrigation season until next). 255 
Brozovic et al (2003) provide a detailed discussion of the consequences of this 256 
assumption. 257 
6. (Two periods) There are only two periods (irrigation seasons), and farmer 258 
preferences over income are additively separable across periods.   259 
Provencher and Burt (1994)  and Saak and Peterson (2007) also consider and provide 260 
justifications for a two-period framework.  The assumption that the aquifer is non-261 
renewable is for expositional convenience, and a positive rate of recharge can be easily 262 
incorporated.  The groundwater extractions are the net quantity of water withdrawn if 263 
some fraction of the water percolates back to the stock.  Next the model notation is 264 
introduced.  265 
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 266 
2.1 Aquifer 267 
The total stock of groundwater stored in the aquifer in the beginning of period 1 is 268 
11 Ahx  , where 1h  is the height of the water table in period 1, and A  is the size of the 269 
area measured in acres (1 acre = 0.4047 ha).  Let },...,1{ AL   denote the set of acres.  270 
The hydraulic heads of the water table under each acre are the same in the beginning of 271 
each period, tjti hh ,,   th  Lji  ,  and 2,1t .  Let tiu ,  denote the quantity of 272 
groundwater applied in period t  on acre i .  By the quasi-bathtub assumption, the per 273 
acre quantity of groundwater withdrawn in each period cannot exceed the per acre stock 274 
or th  275 
 tti hu ,  for all Li  and 2,1t .        (1) 276 
Let  Ai iuAu 1 1,11  denote the average pumping in period 1.  Since there is no recharge, 277 
the stock of groundwater in the aquifer in period 2 is 12 xx  1Au , and the level of the 278 
water table is  279 
 112 uhh  .         (2) 280 
 281 
2.2 Land ownership 282 
There are n  farmers (users of groundwater) who are located in the area overlying the 283 
aquifer and grow irrigated crops.  Farmer k  farms acres LLk  , and let kA  || kL  284 
denote the number of irrigable acres owned by farmer k , where AAn
k k
 1 .  In what 285 
follows, the set of acres kL  will be referred to as “farm k ” or “farmer k ”.  For 286 
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concreteness, the farm indices are assumed to be ordered by farm size, nAAA  ...21 .  287 
Throughout, the first symbol in doubly subscripted variables identifies the acre and the 288 
second identifies the period, 2,1t .  Variables with one subscript typically refer to the 289 
aggregate values in the specified period, unless they are farm-specific and invariant 290 
across periods.  The letters ji,  will index acres, and letters lk,  will index farmers. 291 
 292 
2.3 Production technology 293 
The periodic per acre benefit of water consumption net of all costs including groundwater 294 
pumping cost is 295 
 ),( , tti hug ,          (3) 296 
where g  is strictly increasing and concave.  While irrigation increases yield, a higher 297 
groundwater stock decreases the cost of pumping due to a decrease in pumping lift, and 298 
increases the efficiency of irrigation by permitting a more flexible application schedule. 299 
Land quality is assumed to be homogeneous so that total farm income is proportional to 300 
farm size (i.e., technology exhibits constant returns to spatial scale).  For simplicity, the 301 
rainfall and surface water supply are the same on all farms in both periods.  For example, 302 
(3) can take the following form: 303 
qzhuczhupyhug z  ),(),,(max),( , 304 
where p  is the per unit price of the crop, y  is yield, and c  is the cost of pumping 305 
groundwater, z  is the vector of other inputs, and q  is the price vector of other inputs.    306 
For notational convenience, let  307 
 ),()( hhghf u ),( hhgh         (4) 308 
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denote the marginal per acre benefit of water consumption evaluated at the point of 309 
depletion of an individual groundwater stock. (Here and throughout, subscripts on 310 
functions denote differentiation with respect to the lettered arguments.)  By concavity of 311 
g , 0)(  hf  ),0( 1hh .  All of the results that follow will also hold under weaker 312 
technical conditions, namely 0uug , 0hhg , and  )(hf  ),( hhguu ),( hhghh 0),(2  hhguh , 313 
which are implied by concavity of g . 314 
 Let v  denote the periodic utility of farm income, 0,0  vv .  Each farmer 315 
maximizes the sum of utilities of the whole-farm revenue in each period:  316 
    2,1 ,}{ )),((max , t Li ttiuk kkLiti hugv  subject to (1) and (2).  (5) 317 
For simplicity, there is no discounting of future income. 318 
3. Social planner 319 
Before turning to the analysis of the competitive allocation by non-cooperating users, the 320 
efficient allocation is first characterized.  The social planner chooses }{ ,
s
tiu  to maximize 321 
producer welfare conditional on the land ownership distribution: 322 
      2,1 1 ,}{ )),((max , t nk Li tstius ks ti hugvW  subject to (1) and (2).  (6) 323 
The following result shows that the efficient allocation of groundwater 324 
compensates for income inequality caused by the inequality in farm sizes.  The common 325 
resource may serve as a vehicle to decrease income inequality by redistributing income 326 
from larger farmers to smaller farmers.  This effect is absent if either farm sizes are 327 
identical, or farmers’ periodic utility functions are linear in income.  Note that optimal 328 
groundwater consumption in the final period exhausts the remaining stock on each farm, 329 
and hence, must be identical on all acres, 22,2, huu
s
j
s
i   Lji  , , because the income 330 
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utility and water benefit functions are strictly increasing.  And so, the focus is solely on 331 
period 1 pumping.  All proofs that are not in the text are in the Appendix. 332 
 333 
Proposition 1.  (Efficient pumping) Efficient allocation of groundwater is  334 
a) invariant across acres, sj
s
i uu 1,1,   Lji  , , and is determined by  335 
 0)(),( 1,111,  sisiu uhfhug ,       (7)  336 
if either farmers have linear utility, 0v , or acreage is uniformly distributed across 337 
farmers, nAAk /  for nk ,...,1 ; 338 
(b) characterized by smaller farmers pumping groundwater faster, sju 1, siu 1, , for 339 
kLj , lLi , lk  ,  if 0v  (decreasing marginal utility of income). 340 
 341 
(7) is easiest to interpret for the special case when the water benefit depends only on 342 
water use, u.  In this case, it is efficient to equalize the marginal benefits of water use in 343 
the two periods: )()( 1,11,
s
iu
s
iu uhgug  , which implies that 2/11, husi   Li .  This is 344 
equivalent to the assertion that, in the absence of a pumping cost externality and 345 
inequality of income across farmers, the efficient solution distributes the available water 346 
equally across the two periods on each farm. 347 
 It is convenient to differentiate between the case when farmers’ per period 348 
marginal utility of income is (1) constant (i.e., utility is linear), and (2) decreasing (i.e., 349 
utility is concave).  In the former case, from the social planner’s point of view, a non-350 
uniform distribution of acreage across farmers has no effect on either the optimal 351 
allocation of water either spatially or temporally.  However, as demonstrated in the next 352 
section, such differences may still arise in competitive equilibrium.  In the latter case, as 353 
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is demonstrated in Part (b) of Proposition 1, the social planner faces a trade-off between 354 
dynamic and distributional sources of inefficiencies.   355 
From a policy perspective, an important insight of the analysis to follow is that, in 356 
the presence of farmer heterogeneity, competitive allocations go beyond the tragedy of 357 
the commons, and affect income inequality as well.  The welfare difference between the 358 
optimal and competitive allocations may be particularly large, when, from the societal 359 
point of view, the income distribution matters.  This happens when the equilibrium 360 
distribution of pumping rates across heterogeneous farmers amplifies the income 361 
inequality caused by size inequality.  However, the competitive allocation may also 362 
moderate the inherent inequality in income distribution caused by the inequality in land 363 
ownership, or even change its sign, whereas total incomes over two periods earned by 364 
smaller farmers exceed that of larger ones. 365 
 366 
4. Linear utility  367 
This section considers the case of linear utility functions, 0v .  The competitive 368 
equilibrium is first characterized, followed by an analysis of the effect of inequality in 369 
farm sizes on the groundwater stock and the distribution of income. 370 
 371 
4.1. Equilibrium 372 
Farmers are non-cooperative, and each farmer takes the quantity of water pumped by 373 
others in each period as given.  In period 2, all farmers exhaust the available stocks of 374 
groundwater on each acre, so that 2
*
2, hui   for Li .  By (5), in period 1 farmer k ’s 375 
payoff is 376 
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 k ),(),(max 2211,}{ 1, hhghugkkLii Li iu   subject to (1) and (2).  (8) 377 
The competitive allocation can now be characterized.  Differentiating (8), the best 378 
response by farmer k  on acre kLi , *1,iu , satisfies 379 
 ),( *1, xug iu )( 2hfak 0 , if *1,iu 1h , and *1,iu 1h , if otherwise  (9) 380 
where AAa kk /  is the share of the aquifer that can be captured by farmer k .  (9) can 381 
be written in a more compact form 382 
 *1,iu ,min[ 1h )]);(( 121 hhfag ku ,  kLi      (10) 383 
where )(.;1 hgu
  is the inverse of ),( hugu  obtained by treating h  as a parameter.  Note 384 
that per acre pumping rates on each farm are identical * 1,
*
1, ji uu   kLji  , .  Summing 385 
pumping rates (10) over all nk ,...,1  and kLi , and substituting (2), yields 386 
 *1u   nk k ha1 1,min[ )]);(( 1*111 huhfag ku  ,     (11) 387 
where  Ai iuAu 1 *1,*1 )/1(  is the equilibrium average pumping in period 1.  By concavity 388 
of g , (11) uniquely determines the aggregate pumping in period 1, *1u .  Together (10) 389 
and (11) prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. 390 
 391 
Proposition 2.  (Competitive allocation) Suppose that farmers’ utility is linear in income.  392 
Competitive equilibrium exists, it is unique, and is given by (10) and (11).  The average 393 
pumping rate is higher than the socially efficient average rate, suu 1
*
1  . Also, smaller 394 
farmers pump faster than larger farmers, *1,iu * 1,ju , for any kLi , lLj , lk  . 395 
 396 
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Comparing the first-order conditions that characterize the efficient and competitive 397 
allocations, (7) and (9), respectively, shows that the discrepancy between them arises 398 
along both spatial and temporal dimensions.  That is, the competitive allocation leads to 399 
an inefficiently high aggregate pumping in period 1, which entails an inefficient 400 
allocation of groundwater across periods.  Nonetheless, it is possible that individual 401 
farmers extract groundwater at a slower rate than the socially efficient average rate, i.e. 402 
s
i uu 1
*
1,   for some i  (see Section Small and large farms: an example and Figure 1b).  403 
Also, unless all farmers are identical, the competitive allocation results in inefficient 404 
pumping rates across farmers in period 1.  Recall that, by Proposition 1(a), efficiency 405 
requires that the per acre irrigation application rates be identical when farmers have linear 406 
utility. 407 
Under linear utility, smaller farmers always deviate more from the socially efficient 408 
allocation.  However, it is not clear whether the non-uniformity of the distribution of land 409 
ownership, in and of itself, leads to a loss or gain of total farm income.  As shown in the  410 
next section, the effects of the inequality in farm sizes on the groundwater stock and farm 411 
income depend on rather subtle properties of the agricultural production function. 412 
 413 
4.2. Inequality in farm sizes 414 
The measure of inequality that is used to model an increase in the concentration of land 415 
ownership (a smaller share of farmers owns a larger share of land) is introduced next. The 416 
rest of this section analyzes the effect of inequality in farm sizes on the remaining 417 
groundwater stock and on total income.  An example is presented that illustrates the 418 
findings. 419 
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 420 
4.2.1. Measuring inequality 421 
To model the effect of increased inequality in land holdings a precise measure of 422 
inequality is needed.  The analysis here relies on the Lorenz measure, which is widely 423 
used to measure wealth inequality more generally.  Let W

 = (W1, ..., Wn) denote a vector 424 
of wealth (in this paper, wealth is measured by the area of land owned) by n individuals, 425 
where W1 W2  ... Wn and Wkk1
n W .  The Lorenz measure of  W is defined as 426 
(l / n,W )  Wkk1
l W ; its interpretation is the share of land held by the smallest 427 
100(l / n) percent of farmers.  If W

 is a perfectly equal wealth distribution (i.e., 428 
Wk W / n k ), then the Lorenz function is linear in x  l / n with a slope of 1; for all 429 
other distributions it is a (weakly) convex curve that never lies above this line. In general, 430 
increasing inequality implies more curvature of the Lorenz curve, so that the value of   431 
at a given value of x will be smaller.   432 
The effect of inequality in farm size is modeled by comparing the equilibrium 433 
under the given distribution of land holdings, nAAA  ...21 , to an alternative 434 
distribution, nBBB  ...21   ( ABnk k  1 ).   Where distribution B  is more unequal 435 
distribution A

 based on the Lorenz measure: (l / n, A)  (l / n, B)l 1,  , n . The 436 
proofs of several of the propositions below rely on the majorization order, a  general tool 437 
to compare the dissimilarity within the components of vectors that is closely related to the 438 
Lorenz measure. Marshall and Olkin (1979) provide a comprehensive treatment of 439 
majorization. 440 
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Definition.  Real vector A

 is majorized by B

, denoted BA m
  , if  lk kA1  Bkk1l  441 
for nl ,...,1 , and  nk kA1   nk kB1 . 442 
 443 
Thus, the comparison of interest can be expressed as the majorization BA m
  . A related 444 
notion of Schur-concave and Schur-convex functions will also be needed.  A real-valued 445 
function )(Ay

 is called Schur-concave if BA m
   implies )(Ay   y( B), and )(Ay   is 446 
Schur-convex, if )(Ay
  is Schur-concave.  Schur-concavity might be more intuitively 447 
called “Schur-monotonicity” because it simply requires function y to always decrease in 448 
response to a perturbation that induces more dissimilarity in its arguments.  The Lorenz 449 
function itself is an example of a Schur-concave function.  The analysis to follow will 450 
appeal to the following important property of Schur-concave functions.  Suppose that 451 
  nk kAzAy 1 )()(  .  Then )(Ay   is Schur-concave if and only if z  is concave. 452 
 453 
4.2.2. Measuring concavity 454 
The analysis that follows will also depend on the curvature properties 455 
(specifically the degree of concavity) of the agricultural production function, g. Even 456 
though there is no uncertainty in this model, it is convenient to derive its results using 457 
well-known measures of curvature from the literature on decisionmaking under 458 
uncertainty.  Let ),(/),( 11 hughugR uuu  denote the index of concavity of agricultural 459 
output function, and ),(/),( 11 hughugP uuuuu  denote the index of concavity of the 460 
marginal output function of a farmer with technology ),( 1hug  in period 1.  If  ),( 1hug  461 
were a utility of income function, then R  would be interpreted as the Arrow-Pratt 462 
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coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and P  would be the coefficient of absolute 463 
prudence.  464 
As g represents technology and not preferences in the model here, these indexes 465 
are employed simply as measures of the curvature of the physical relation between output 466 
and water.  In this non-stochastic framework, they are indicators of the strength of the 467 
motive to smooth water extraction over time (i.e., the diminishing marginal productivity 468 
of water).  Adding uncertainty will not change the qualitative nature of the results. There 469 
is an empirical literature on the relationship between farmers’ risk preferences and their 470 
dynamic use of groundwater (e.g., Antle (1983, 1987) and Koundouri et al. 2006) as well 471 
as on the effects of risk preferences on farmer’s reaction to water quota policies (e.g., 472 
Groom et al. 2006). 473 
 474 
4.2.3. Inequality of farm sizes and groundwater stock 475 
With the definitions above, the relationship between inequality and the residual water 476 
stock in period 2 can now be analyzed. 477 
 478 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that farmers’ utility is linear in income.  Then under more 479 
unequal distribution of farm sizes, BA m
  , the groundwater stock in period 2 480 
(a) increases, )()( *2
*
2 BhAh
  , if PR 2 ;   481 
(b) decreases, )()( *2
*
2 BhAh
  , if (i) B1 / A ))((/),( *211 Ahfhhgu
 , i.e. the smallest farm 482 
under the new land ownership distribution is not “too small” and (ii) PR 2 .    483 
 484 
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 The inequality in land ownership creates a trade-off in terms of its effect on the 485 
pumping decisions in period 1.  A heavier left tail of the acreage distribution implies that 486 
there are more farmers who own a smaller share of the aquifer and tend to pump faster 487 
than the average farmer.  However, a heavier right tail implies the opposite.  Therefore, 488 
ascertaining the effect of any increase in acreage inequality on the competitive allocation 489 
requires structure on the farm-size sensitivity of the difference in pumping rates between 490 
small and large farmers, * 1,
*
1, ji uu  , where kLi , lLj , lk AA  .  The farm-size 491 
sensitivity of the difference in pumping rates across farms is )(/)( kkk auaua  , where  492 
)( kau 1121 ));(( hhhfag ku  . If the pumping rate differential, u , is increasing (decreasing), 493 
the sensitivity is negative (positive). 494 
Condition (a) states that, when the aquifer is full, the agricultural output, )(., 1hg , 495 
is in a sense more concave than the marginal output, )(., 1hgu .  Then the perceived 496 
benefit from a more stable inter-seasonal groundwater use pattern increases with size at 497 
an accelerating rate, and a greater inequality stimulates, on average, a slower pumping 498 
rate.  Note that condition PR )(2   is equivalent to log-concavity (log-convexity) of the 499 
first derivative of the demand for water with respect to output when the aquifer is full, 500 
);( 1
1 hyg y
 , where )};(:{);( 11
1 hugyuhyg   is the inverse of agricultural output 501 
function obtained by treating the stock of groundwater, 1h , as a parameter. 502 
To guarantee that the average pumping rate increases, the additional condition (i) 503 
in Part (b) is needed because the aquifer is a quasi-bathtub (see constraint (1)).  This 504 
condition puts a limit on the increase in the size of large farms.  It implies that, under the 505 
new distribution of land ownership, the number of farmers who grow irrigated crops is 506 
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the same, 01 B , and that, under the initial distribution of land ownership, no farmer 507 
depleted his/her stock of groundwater in period 1, 1
*
1, )( hAui 

 for all 1Li , where 1 is 508 
the index of the smallest farmer.  509 
 510 
4.2.4. Farm-size inequality and farm income 511 
The effect of  farm size inequality on total farm income is now considered.  In the case of 512 
linear utility, (6) becomes  513 
   nk kc AW 1)(    nk k gA1 ({ ,min[ 1h )},())],);(( *2*211*21 hhghhhfag ku  ,    (12) 514 
where *2h
*
11 uh   is given by (11), and )(AW c

 symbolizes the dependence of total farm 515 
income (agricultural output) on the distribution of land ownership among farmers. 516 
 The farm-size inequality affects both the groundwater stock in period 2 (dynamic 517 
allocation) and the distribution of groundwater application rates across farms in period 1 518 
(spatial allocation).  Keeping everything else equal, a more stable inter-seasonal pattern 519 
of groundwater use increases total farm income.  The distributional effect of farm-size 520 
inequality on farm income is more difficult because a higher variability in farm sizes may 521 
or may not lead to a higher variability in the per acre pumping rates (see Proposition 3).     522 
 523 
Proposition 4.  Suppose that farmers’ utility is linear in income.  Then under more 524 
unequal distribution of farm sizes, BA m
  , total farm income 525 
(a) decreases, )()( BWAW cc
  , if  (i) PR 3  and (ii) )()( *2*2 BhAh
  ;   526 
 25
(b) increases, )()( BWAW cc
  , if (i) the smallest farm under the new land 527 
ownership distribution is not “too small”, B1 / A ))((/),(
*
211 Ahfhhgu
 , (ii) PR 3 , and 528 
(iii) )()( *2
*
2 BhAh
  .    529 
 530 
Conditions in (a) guarantee that the unequal distribution of farm acreage 531 
aggravates both the distributional (a(i)) and dynamic (a(ii)) inefficiencies, that are 532 
associated with the competitive allocation.  Condition a(i) requires that the net benefit of 533 
irrigation when the aquifer is full, ),( 1hug , is in a sense more concave than the marginal 534 
benefit, ),( 1hugu .  Then a greater inequality in farm sizes stimulates a greater variability 535 
in (acreage-weighted) pumping rates and lowers total output.  Observe that a(i) is less 536 
stringent than (a) in Proposition 3.  This is because the net benefit of irrigation, ),( 1hug , 537 
is concave in u , which adds additional curvature, and thus, on average, a smaller (or 538 
positive) farm-size sensitivity of the spatial pumping rate differential suffices to cause a 539 
total output loss. 540 
Part (b) has a similar interpretation.  Condition b(i) is the same as in Proposition 541 
3.  But now sufficient condition b(ii) is more stringent compared with b(ii) in Proposition 542 
3.  This is because a negative and “sufficiently” large (in absolute value) farm-size 543 
sensitivity of the spatial pumping rate differential is required in order to assuredly raise 544 
total output.  Note that condition PR )(3   is equivalent to concavity (convexity) of the 545 
first derivative of the inverse output function (i.e., demand for water as a function of 546 
output) when the aquifer is full, );( 1
1 hyg y
 . 547 
Combining Propositions 3(b) and 4(a) yields 548 
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 549 
Corollary.  Suppose that farmers utility is linear in income.  Then under more unequal 550 
distribution of farm sizes, BA m
  , total farm income decreases, )()( BWAW cc   , if 551 
RPR 32  .   552 
 553 
Sufficient conditions under which more unequal distribution of farm sizes has an 554 
unambiguously positive effect on total farm income cannot be obtained in this way.  To 555 
guarantee a lesser inequality in pumping rates, the pumping rate spatial differential, 556 
)( kau , must be “sufficiently” decreasing (in absolute value) with farm size.  In contrast, 557 
to guarantee a more stable average pumping rate, the pumping rate spatial differential 558 
must be increasing or “slightly” decreasing (in absolute value) with farm size.   559 
 Furthermore, as clear from the proof of Proposition 4 (see (21) in Appendix), the 560 
sign of kk A /  is ambiguous.  Therefore, it is possible that smaller farmers earn more 561 
total income than larger farmers, lk    for lk  .  Of course, larger farmers always 562 
have higher total revenues in period 2.  But smaller farmers have more intensive-margin 563 
operations and higher per acre revenues in period 1.  The differential in total revenues 564 
between small and large farmers in period 1 can be positive, and even exceed the 565 
magnitude of the negative differential in total revenues in period 2.  Intuitively, smaller 566 
farmers will earn higher profits from being  in a better strategic position to take 567 
advantage of the common property resource; they are able to steal more groundwater per 568 
unit of land than their larger neighbors.  The following example illustrates. 569 
 570 
4.2.5. Small and large farms: an example 571 
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Let )(),( zuhug  , )1,0( , 15.0 hz  , and 0v .  By Proposition 1, the efficient 572 
allocation of groundwater across acres and seasons is invariant to the distribution of land 573 
ownership, and is given by 11, 5.0 hu
s
i   for Li .  The maximal regional farm income is 574 
)5.0(2 1 zhAW
s  .   575 
For simplicity, all farms fall in one of the two categories: small and large.  The 576 
size of small farms is s  acres, sAk   for mk ,...,1 , and the size of large farms is l  577 
acres, lAk   for nmk ,...,1 , where ls  .  The number of small farms is m , and the 578 
number of large farms is mn  , where Almnms  )( .  By (10) and (11) equilibrium 579 
pumping in period 1 is 580 
)])(1()
1
)1(()(,min[ )1/(11
)1/(1
1
*
1,
 
 
A
sz
E
EzEh
A
shui  for kLi , mk ,...,1 , 581 
 
AmnlAl
AlzAsmuh
u mi /)()/(
)1))/((/
)1/(1
)1/(1*
1,1*
1, 
 



 for kLi  and nmk ,...,1  582 
where )])/)(()/( )1/()1/(    AlmnAsmE . 583 
For concreteness, this example consider a special case of an increase in farm size 584 
inequality whereas small farms get uniformly smaller and large farms get uniformly 585 
larger.  Note that ))(,;())(,;( slmsAslmsA m    for ss  , where 586 
)/()()( mnmsAsl  .  Clearly, a uniform shift of acreage from small farms to large 587 
farms, keeping the number of farms in each size category fixed, constitutes an increase in 588 
farm size inequality.  Inequality can then be measured simply as the gap between the 589 
acreage on small and large farms, 0 sl , keeping the number of each type of 590 
farms, m , fixed.   591 
 592 
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In Figure 1, parameters are: 8.0 , 3.0z , 100n , 50m , 11 h , and 593 
000,100A .  Then the maximal farm income per acre is 8.12.010/ AW s .  At 0  594 
(i.e., 1000 ls ), small and large farms are the same, and the distribution of land 595 
ownership is uniform across farmers. The effects of an increase in farm size inequality on 596 
the equilibrium groundwater stocks, pumping rates, and incomes are analyzed next. 597 
As shown in Figure 1(a), when the difference in farm sizes is relatively small, 598 
280 , the difference in the pumping rates increases until the small farmers deplete 599 
their wells in period 1, 11
*
1,  hui  for kLi  and 50,...,1k .  This limits the ability of 600 
small farmers to “steal” groundwater from their neighbors, and therefore, establishes an 601 
upper bound on the difference in the pumping rates.  Curiously, the large farmers pump 602 
less than the efficient quantity, 5.05.0 1
*
1,  hui  for kLi  and 100,...,51k , when 603 
[ 220, 400].  In this range, the gain in the dynamic efficiency for the large farmers 604 
outweighs the loss associated with letting the small farmers steal their groundwater.  605 
However, as the size of each large farm, and hence the total share of the aquifer farmed 606 
by large farms, increases, large farmers are able to more effectively “push” the aggregate 607 
groundwater use towards the efficient allocation.  Even though the incentive to pump 608 
groundwater efficiently for each individual large farmer declines, the aggregate 609 
groundwater usage in period 1 decreases.  This is because the distribution of total acreage 610 
is skewed more (less) heavily towards large (small) farmers, who pump slowly (who 611 
deplete their wells in period 1). 612 
Figure 1(b) illustrates the non-monotone relationship between the stock of 613 
groundwater in period 2 and farm-size inequality.  As explained earlier, when the gap 614 
between small and large farms is small, [ 0, 280], the large farmers are relatively 615 
 29
ineffective in raising the dynamic efficiency.  This is because, even though they decrease 616 
their pumping rates in order to compensate for the higher pumping rates by small 617 
farmers, their weight in aggregate pumping is relatively light.  And so, the negative effect 618 
of the aggressive pumping by small farms dominates, and the groundwater stock in 619 
period 2 falls.  As the share of total acreage owned by small farmers declines, but their 620 
pumping rates remain constant ( 11
*
1,  hui  for kLi  and 50,...,1k ), the large farmers 621 
need to give up less of period 1 pumping to push the region towards more dynamically 622 
efficient allocation.  From the perspective of a large farmer, the groundwater resource is 623 
more private, which reinforces the diminished influence of aggressive pumping by small 624 
farmers.  As a result, the average stock in period 2 increases, and the region moves 625 
towards a more dynamically (and spatially) efficient allocation. 626 
Figure 1(c) shows the non-monotone effect of the inequality in farm sizes on total 627 
income.  Proposition 4 shows that, in general, an increase in size inequality affects the 628 
total farm income in two distinct ways.  First, it affects the groundwater stock in period 2.  629 
Second, it affects the variability of the pumping rates among farmers in period 1.  When 630 
the gap is small, [ 0, 280], both the “stock” and “pumping rate variability” effects 631 
work in the same direction.  When the gap is “sufficiently” large, any further increase in 632 
farm-size inequality raises the total farm income.  Note that the dip in the total income in 633 
Figure 1(c) has a rather pointed peak.  This is because for 280  there is an additional 634 
income gain associated with the gain in the spatial efficiency due to the decline in the 635 
heterogeneity of pumping rates.  The period 1 pumping on large farms increases, while 636 
pumping on small farms remains constant (as they deplete their wells in period 1).   637 
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As shown in Figure 1(d), total per farm incomes are also non-monotone in the 638 
extent of farm-size inequality.  Surprisingly, the total small farm income increases when 639 
the acreage on small farms decreases in the range [ 0, 280].  The converse holds for 640 
large farms.  This is because small farms are in a better position to steal groundwater 641 
from their neighbors operating on large farms.  However, the cap on the pumping in 642 
period 1, 1*1, iu , eventually annuls this effect.  Consequently, a further increase in farm- 643 
size inequality affects farm incomes in the expected direction because, keeping 644 
everything else equal, a smaller (larger) acreage entails a smaller (larger) whole-farm 645 
income. 646 
 647 
5. Concave utility   648 
So far, the analysis has considered the effect of farm-size heterogeneity on welfare in the 649 
case of farmers with linear utility functions (constant marginal utility of income).  As 650 
shown next, relaxing this assumption may lead to rather different conclusions.  Even the 651 
result that smaller farmers pump faster under the competitive allocation may no longer 652 
hold.  This section considers the case of farmers with (strictly) concave per period utility 653 
functions, 0v . To highlight the role of concavity of utility, profit per unit of land area 654 
(e.g., yield) is now assumed to be a linear function of the amount of water applied per 655 
acre, and that pumping costs do not depend on the hydraulic head, uhug ),( .   656 
Following the same steps as before, it can be shown that the equilibrium best 657 
response of farmer k  on acre kLi , *1,iu , is  658 
 *1,iu ,min[ 1h )))]((()/1( *1111 uhAvavA kkk  ,  kLi    (13) 659 
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where (.)11
v  is the inverse of v , and the average pumping in period 1, *1u , solves 660 
 *1u   nk k hAA 1 1,min[)/1( )))]((( *1111 uhAvav kk  .    (14) 661 
Let )(/)()( uvuvuur   denote the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion of a 662 
farmer with the periodic utility of income v . 663 
 664 
Proposition 5.  Suppose that farmers’ utility is strictly concave in income . Then the 665 
average pumping rate is higher than the socially efficient average rate, suu 1
*
1  , and for 666 
all kLi , lLj , lk   667 
a) smaller farms pump faster, *1,iu
*
1,ju , if 0r . 668 
b) smaller farms pump slower, *1,iu
*
1,ju , if )()))(((1 11 ahArahAvavr    669 
],[ lk aaa  and )5.0,0( 1hh .  670 
 671 
Farm size has two effects on the farmer’s pumping decision.  On the one hand, 672 
larger farmers view their stock of groundwater as a relatively more private resource.  This 673 
provides them with a greater incentive to push the regional use towards a dynamically 674 
more efficient allocation.  On the other hand, larger farmers may have a smaller 675 
(negative) difference in marginal utilities of income in periods 1 and 2.  This diminishes 676 
their incentive to push the region towards a dynamically more efficient allocation 677 
compared with smaller farmers.  The “private resource” effect dominates if the 678 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion is increasing in income.  The “income scale” effect 679 
dominates if the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is “sufficiently” large and decreasing 680 
in income (in the sense of condition in Part (b)). 681 
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 While not reported here due to space constraints, the counterparts of Proposition 682 
3-4 carry over to the case of concave utility as well.  Competitive allocations may either 683 
exacerbate or alleviate income inequality associated with the distribution of land holdings 684 
among farmers.  If the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is increasing in income, small 685 
farmers pump more groundwater per acre than large farmers.  This lessens the income 686 
inequality caused by an unequal distribution of acreage.  The converse is true if larger 687 
farmers pump more aggressively (on a per acre basis), which is possible if the coefficient 688 
of relative risk-aversion is “sufficiently” large and decreasing. 689 
Note that, in the absence of the effect of farm-size inequality on the disaggregated 690 
pumping rates, from the societal point of view, the heterogeneity in land holdings is 691 
immaterial if farmers are risk-neutral (i.e., they value marginal income in both periods 692 
independently of the number of acres they farm).  When farmers are risk-averse, the 693 
heterogeneity in the pumping rates can be welfare-increasing, given that the per acre 694 
irrigation rates increase on smaller farms and decrease on larger ones, so that in period 1 695 
income is redistributed from rich to poor farmers (see Proposition 1).  However, because 696 
of the decreasing marginal per acre benefits of water, total income always decreases 697 
under a greater variability of the pumping rates.  This may create a tension between the 698 
effects of farm-size inequality on income distribution and total income (output).  The next 699 
section takes a policy perspective and investigates the workings of a very simple 700 
groundwater use policy in the presence of farmer heterogeneity. 701 
 702 
6. Policy analysis: an example of flat-rate quota policy 703 
 33
The analysis now considers some political economy aspects of implementing a simple 704 
policy that allocates per period per farm pumping quotas.  Suppose that the policy takes 705 
the form 706 
qAu kLi ik  *1,  and ]0,max[ *1,*2,    kk Li ikkLi i uqAqAu  for nk ,...,1 ,       (15) 707 
where ],0( 1hq  is the per acre quota (measured in acre-feet), and the quota allocated to 708 
each farm is proportional to its size.  The quota limits the quantity of groundwater 709 
extracted in each period, but allows farmers to carry over unused portions of their quota 710 
into the next period.  There is no market for water rights, and the unused quotas cannot be 711 
bought or sold. 712 
For concreteness, the case of risk-neutral farmers and a strictly concave 713 
agricultural output function (analyzed in Section Linear utility) is considered.  The 714 
following result establishes that, while this policy always slows the rate of the aquifer 715 
depletion, the effect on farmer incomes is likely heterogeneous.  The setting is assumed 716 
to be such that the equilibrium pumping rates decrease with time *2,
*
1, ii uu   Li , so 717 
that *21
*
1 5.0 uhu  .  For example, this is always true if all farmers are sufficiently small 718 
relative to the aquifer, na  )}(/),({inf 111),0( 1 uhfhuhguhu  .  Then, under quota 719 
policy (15), farmers do not transfer the unused portion of their quotas from period 1 to 720 
period 2: *2,
*
1, ii uuq  , if 2/1hq  , and quu ii  *2,*1,  Li  if 2/1hq  .  Hence, for 721 
2/1hq   equilibrium is given by 722 
 )(*1, qui ,min[q )]));((( 1*111 hquhfag ku  ,  kLi , nk ,...,1   (16)  723 
 )(*1 qu   nk k qa1 ,min[ )]));((( 1*111 hquhfag ku   .    (17) 724 
The income of farmer k  under the quota policy is 725 
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 ({)( gAq kk  ,q )},() 11 qhqgh  , if 2/1hq  , and   (18) 726 
 ({)( gAq kk  ,min[q ))],));((( 11*111 hhquhfag ku      (19) 727 
))}(),(( *11
*
11 quhquhg  , if 2/1hq  .  728 
From (18) it follows that all farmers lose (gain) from a more restrictive quota, if the 729 
initial quota is sufficiently small and the marginal benefit of a higher stock is “small” 730 
(“large”) relative to the marginal benefit of water consumption: kk Aqq  /)(  731 
),({ 1hqgu 0)()},(),( 11  qhqgqhqg hu  for all nk ,...,1 .  On the other hand, 732 
from (19) it follows that the income of large farmers, who are not bound by the quota, 733 
increases because the quota policy slows down the average pumping rate in period 1. 734 
Let }1  )),((/),(:sup{)( *21 nkqhfhqgakqm uk  .  Note that )(qm  is a non-735 
increasing function.  Then farmers )(,...,1 qmk   are bound by the quota in period 1.  736 
Also, farmers ,...,1k )( 1hqm   deplete their wells in period 1, where 1hq   737 
symbolizes the absence of the quota policy. 738 
 739 
Proposition 6.  Suppose that the quota is applicable, qhqu  )( 1*1,1 .  Then under the 740 
groundwater quota policy 1hqq   741 
a) the groundwater stock in period 2 increases, )()( 212 qqhhqh   1hq  .  742 
Suppose that the period 2 quota is not binding, 2/1hq  .  Then 743 
b) large farmers gain, )()( 1 qqhq kk    for nqmk ,...,1)(  ; 744 
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c) small farmers lose, )()( 1 qqhq kk    for )(,...,1 1hmk  , if (i) 0uuug , 745 
0uuhg , 0),(),(2  hhghhg hhuh , and (ii)   n zk kzk kz aaa 1 211 /  for all 746 
)(),...,( 1 qmhmz  . 747 
 748 
Farmers in the medium size range, )( 1hm )(qmk  , may lose or gain from a quota.  749 
The intuition for this result is very clear: Small farmers, who pump faster than the 750 
average farmer, stand to lose the most from a quota policy.  Large farmers, who are not 751 
restricted by the policy, strictly gain from the quota because of the more stable inter-752 
seasonal allocation of groundwater induced by this policy.   753 
This illustrates that policies that do not account for user heterogeneity, are likely to 754 
affect not only the inter-seasonal but also the spatial distribution of incomes among 755 
farmers.  The ensuing political economy issues and the relative weight of small and large 756 
farmers in the policy-making process pose additional constraints on the design of 757 
efficient groundwater management policies. 758 
 759 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 760 
This article has analyzed the economic inefficiencies that arise when farmers controlling 761 
operations of varying sizes withdraw irrigation water from a common aquifer. Farm size 762 
inequality was shown to affect the degree of inefficiency because small farmers are more 763 
strongly influenced by common property externalities than large farmers, who have an 764 
incentive to internalize inter-well costs within their operations. This insight alone has the 765 
policy implication that the gains from groundwater management are likely to be greater 766 
in regions populated by small farms, such as in developing nations.  767 
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The overall effect of an increase in inequality on social welfare was shown to be 768 
ambiguous and dependent on the agricultural production function as well as on the 769 
differences in marginal utility between large and small farmers. To the extent that these 770 
relationships vary across regions, it is one explanation for wide gaps in the prosperity of 771 
groundwater-dependent agricultural regions.  772 
Sufficient conditions were established to identify the cases where increased 773 
inequality reduces aggregate welfare, and these conditions which appear to be quite 774 
restrictive. This finding suggests that in many regions, there is a meaningful, if not 775 
recognized, policy tradeoff between common property distortions and inequality. Wealth 776 
disparities within the farm population is a concern in both high and low income countries, 777 
particularly as it relates to the incomes of small farmers (Hoppe et al. 2010).  However, in 778 
the case of access to a common aquifer, a reduction in inequality may have the 779 
unintended effect of accelerating the depletion of the resource. Moreover, the analysis 780 
reveals that the common aquifer can, in effect, become a conduit to transfer income from 781 
large to small farmers.  782 
Finally, water management policies designed to correct common property 783 
externalities were demonstrated to have potentially significant and undesirable 784 
distributional impacts. In particular, it was shown that a quota policy may well reduce the 785 
speed of aquifer depletion as intended, but the welfare gains from groundwater 786 
conservation will not be evenly distributed; in general irrigators in certain size classes 787 
will incur welfare losses.  788 
789 
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Appendix 855 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, note that in period 2, the planner optimally exhausts 856 
the remaining stock on each farm because g and v  are strictly increasing. This implies 857 
that constraint (1) binds for t = 2 (i.e., siu 2, = h2 Li ), so that (6) can be written 858 
 ))),(()),(((max 221 ,}{ 1, hhgAvhugvW k
n
k Li t
s
tiu
s
k
s
i
    . 859 
Because  kLi tsti hug ),( ,  is symmetric and concave in siu 1, , and sW  is symmetric in (.)v , 860 
optimality requires that siu 1,
s
ju 1,  for any kLi  and lLj  if lk AA  .  Additionally, 861 
corner solutions are ruled out because v  and g  are increasing and concave in each 862 
argument.  The first-order conditions for a maximum are  863 
0)),(()()1,()),((
1 1111
11
1,11,   nl ssllssiusik uhuhgAvAA uhfughugAv ,   (20) 864 
if 11, hu
s
i  , and 11, hu si  , otherwise, for all kLi  and nk ,...,1 .  Part (a) follows by 865 
observing that (20) reduces to (7) when 0v  because AAn
l l
 1 .  Part (b) follows by 866 
observing that only the first term in (20) depends on farm size kA , and, by concavity of 867 
utility function, v , it decreases with kA .  Then by concavity of yield function, g , this 868 
implies that siu 1,  is a non-increasing function of farm acreage.  869 
 870 
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that *11 uu s  .  Then, by (11) 871 
*
1u   nk k ha1 1,min[ )]);(( 1*111 huhfag ku    nk k ha1 1,min[ )]);(( 1111 huhfag sku   872 
   nk k ha1 1,min[ )]);(( 1111 huhfg su  ssu uhuhfg 11111 ));((   . 873 
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The inequalities follow by concavity of g .  The equality follows by (7).  And so, a 874 
contradiction was obtained.  Also, *1,iu ,min[ 1h )]);(( 121 hhfag ku ,min[ 1h  875 
)]);(( 12
1 hhfag lu
 *
1,ju  for any kLi , lLj , lk  .  876 
 877 
 878 
Proof of Proposition 3:  879 
Part (a). Suppose that )()( *2
*
2 BhAh
  .  Then, by (11),  880 
)(*1 Au
   nk k ha1 1 ,min[ )]));((( 1*111 hAuhfag ku   881 
  nk k hb1 1 ,min[ )]));((( 1*111 hAuhfbg ku   882 
  nk k hb1 1 ,min[ )]));((( 1*111 hBuhfbg ku  )(*1 Bu  . 883 
The first inequality follows because the sum of compositions of two concave functions 884 
(here )](.);(,min[ 1
1
1 hfagaha kukk
 ), is Schur-concave in naa ,...,1 .  To show this, it must 885 
be demonstrated that )(1 afagu
  is concave in a .  Differentiating twice yields 886 
2
12 )]([
a
afagu

 
0))()(2(
),()( 1
 uPuR
huguR
f
uu
, 887 
where the inequality follows by condition (a) stated in Proposition 3.  The second 888 
inequality follows by concavity of g .  And so, a contradiction was obtained. 889 
Part (b). Suppose that )()( *2
*
2 BhAh
  . Then, by (11),  890 
)(*1 Au
   nk ka1 )));((( 1*111 hAuhfag ku    nk kb1 )));((( 1*111 hAuhfbg ku   891 
  nk k hb1 1,min[ )]));((( 1*111 hAuhfbg ku   892 
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,min[ 11 hb
n
k k  )]));((( 1*111 hBuhfbg ku  )(*1 Bu  . 893 
The equalities follow because, by condition b(i)  in the statement of Proposition 3 and 894 
concavity of g , 11
*
2
1 ));((( hhAhfag ku 

 and 11
*
2
1 ));((( hhAhfbg ku 

 for all nk ,...,1 , 895 
since BA m
   implies 11 ba  .  The first inequality follows because, by condition b(ii) in 896 
the statement of Proposition 3,  nk ka1 )));((( 1*111 hAuhfag ku   is Schur-convex (see 897 
Part (a)).  The second equality follows by assumption.  And so, a contradiction was 898 
obtained.  899 
 900 
Proof of Proposition 4:  901 
To show parts (a) and (b), we need two facts. 902 
Fact 1. (i) )])(,(min[)( 1 kkkk auhgAaa   is concave in ka  when PR 3 . 903 
 (ii) 
1)(
)(
haukk k
a   is convex in ka  when PR 3 , where ));((()( 1*21 hAhfagau kuk
 .   904 
Proof of fact 1: To verify, differentiate twice with respect to aak  : 905 
)
),(
)(),(()]),(([)(
1
2
1
1
)( 1
hug
afhugA
a
hauagA
a
a
uuhau
k 



 , and   (21) 906 
2
1
2
)(
2
2 )]),(([)(
1
a
hauagA
a
a
hau
k




 )(3(
),()( 1
2
uR
huguR
afA
uu
 0)())(  uP . (22) 907 
depending on whether PR )(3  .  This proves Fact 1(ii).  To show Fact 1(i), note that 908 
)])(,(min[ 1 kk auhga )]),((),,(min[ 111 haugahhga kkk  by monotonicity of g .  Hence, 909 
)])(,(min[ 1 kk auhga  is concave in ia  when PR 3  as a composition of concave 910 
functions. 911 
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Fact 2. 0/ *2  hW c . 912 
Proof of fact 2: *2/ hW
c   inherits the sign of  2221121 /)},()),);((({ hhhghhhafgg u    913 
0)(),(/)( 212  hfhughfa uu , where the inequality follows by concavity of g .  914 
Keeping everything else equal, as the extent of dynamic inefficiency of the competitive 915 
allocation increases, welfare falls.   916 
Part (a).  By (12), 917 
 )(AW c  ,min[({ 11 hgA
n
k k  ))}(),(())],));((( *2*211*21 AhAhghhAhfag ku    918 
  nk k hgB1 1,(min[{ ))}(),(()]),));((( *2*211*21 AhAhghhAhfbg ku    919 
  nk k gB1 ({ ))}(),(())],));(((,min[ *2*211*211 BhBhghhBhfbgh ku   )(BW c  . 920 
The first inequality follows because function )(AW

 is Schur-concave as the sum of 921 
concave functions by condition a(i)  in the statement of Proposition 4and Fact 1(i).  The 922 
second inequality follows by condition a(ii) in the proposition statement and Fact 2.  923 
Part (b).  By condition b(i) in the proposition statement, 1
*
1, )( hAui 

 for all Li  924 
because BA m
   implies that 11 ba   so that 11*21 ));((( hhAhfag ku 

 and 925 
11
*
2
1 ));((( hhAhfbg ku 

 for all nk ,...,1 .  Then, by (12), 926 
)(AW c   nk k gA1 ({ ))}(),(())],));((( *2*211*21 AhAhghhAhfag ku    927 
  nk k gB1 ({ ))}(),(()),));((( *2*211*21 AhAhghhAhfbg ku    928 
  nk k hgB1 1,(min[{ ))}(),(()]),));((( *2*211*21 AhAhghhAhfbg ku    929 
  nk k gB1 ({ ))}(),(())],));(((,min[ *2*211*211 BhBhghhBhfbgh ku   )(BW c  . 930 
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The first inequality follows because function )(AW

 is Schur-convex by Fact 1(ii).  The 931 
equality follows by condition b(ii) in the statement of Proposition 4.  The second 932 
inequality follows by condition b(iii) in the proposition statement and Fact 2.   933 
 934 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that *11 uu s  .  Then, by (20) and (14) in the text, 935 
     nk nl sllks uhAvavhAAu 1 1 111111 )]))(((,min[)/1(  936 
     nk nl llk uhAvavhAA 1 1 *11111 )]))(((,min[)/1(  937 
    nk kkk uhAvavhAA 1 *11111 )))](((,min[)/1( *1u . 938 
The inequalities follow by concavity of v .  And so, a contradiction was obtained. 939 
Part (a). Let kLi .  First, consider 1*1, )( hAu ki  .  By (13), differentiation yields 940 
ki Au  /*1, 0)]()(1))[(/()( 2*1,*1,2  hARuARuAvAhAv kikikkk  941 
The inequality follows because, by (13), *11
*
1, uhui  , and so )(1 *1,ikuAR  942 
))(( *11 uhAR k  1 0 .  If 1*1, hui   then 1* 1, hu j   for lLj , lk  . 943 
Part (b). Proof is analogous.  944 
 945 
Proof of Proposition 6:  946 
Part (a). Note that this is trivially true when the quota is binding in period 2, 2/1hq  , 947 
because then qui *1, , and *2,iu qhh  12  Li .  So consider the case when 948 
2/1hq   and suppose that )()( *11*1 qquhqu  .  Then, by (17),  949 
)( 1
*
1 hqu    nk k ha1 1,min[ )]));((( 11*111 hhquhfag ku   950 
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   nk k qa1 ,min[ )]));((( 11*111 hhquhfag ku   951 
   nk k qa1 ,min[ )]));((( 1*111 hqquhfag ku  )(*1 qqu  , 952 
where the last inequality follows by concavity of g .  And so, a contradiction was 953 
obtained. 954 
Part (b). By (19), farmer k ’s income for nqmk ,...,1)(   is  955 
({)( gAqq kk  ))}(),(()),));((( *11*1111*111 quhquhghhquhfag ku   956 
)())}(),(()),));(((({ 11
*
111
*
11111
*
11
1 hqhuhhuhghhhuhfaggA kkuk    , 957 
where the inequality follows by Part (a), and monotonicity and concavity of g . 958 
Part (c).  By (19), farmer k ’s income is ({)( gAq kk  q )},(), *11*111 uhuhgh   for 959 
)(,...,1 1hmk  .  Differentiation yields  960 
 }){(})(),({)(
*
1
)(
*
11
*
1*
111 q
uauhfA
q
uuhfhqgA
q
q
qmkuk
k





   (23) 961 
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qml l
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qmk
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auhfA . 962 
The first inequality follows because )( 1hm )(qm  , which follows by concavity of g .  963 
The second inequality follows because, by (17), )(*1 qu   )(1qml laq   n qml la1)(  964 
)));((( 1
*
11
1 hquhfag lu  , and implicit differentiation yields 965 
));((/))((1
)(
1
*
1,
*
111)(
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1
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1
hAugquhfa
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liuu
n
qml l
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, 966 
since, by c(i),  967 
),(),(2),()( *11
*
11
*
11
*
11
*
11
*
11
*
11 uhuhguhuhguhuhguhf hhuhuu    968 
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);( 1
*
1, hug iuu . 969 
The third inequality in (23) follows by c(ii).  Hence, )()( 1hqqq kk    for 970 
)(,...,1 1hmk   because  0/)(  qqk  for all ],[ 1hqq  .   971 
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 973 
a) b) 
c) d) 
 974 
Figure 1.  Inequality in farm sizes, pumping rates, and income. (a) Per acre pumping 975 
rates (b) Groundwater stock in period 2 (c) Average income per acre (d) Income for small 976 
and large farms (1 acre = 0.4047 ha = 4047 m2) 977 
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